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than on the way soldiers are organized
before and during combat.” In other
words, post-facto law enforcement is only
one tool, and not a powerful one at that,
in the struggle to prevent atrocities and
war crimes.
It is this breadth of treatment that lifts
Osiel’s discussion far above stereotypical
legal analysis and makes it a truly significant contribution to the literature of military professionalism and military ethics.
Obeying Orders connects the moral argument deeply to the professional commitments of soldiering. Members of the
military profession should be encouraged
to exercise their ethical judgment over as
wide a scope as possible within the functional requirements of military effectiveness and efficiency.
It would be a shame and a mistake if only
military and civilian lawyers chose to
read this profound meditation on the
moral foundations of soldiering itself. Informed by military practicality, and respectful of the possibilities of deepening
and widening the highest senses of military professionalism, Obeying Orders is
the first book on professional ethics that a
seasoned officer ought to read.
MARTIN L. COOK

Professor of Ethics
U.S. Army War College

Smith, George W. The Siege at Hue. Boulder, Colo.:
Lynne Rienner, 1999. 195pp. $49.95

George W. Smith has provided an excellent historical summary of the battle of
Hue, based on his personal experience as
an information officer assigned to the 1st
Division of the Army of the Republic of
(South) Vietnam (ARVN), and on
after-action reports, articles, and

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001

5/14/01
Monday, May 14, 2001 3:33:09 PM

BOOK REVIEWS

145

interviews. The book highlights the complexities and dynamics of conducting
military operations in urban terrain, particularly in a combat environment.
Hue had been the imperial capital of
Vietnam, and it was the country’s cultural and intellectual center. It was South
Vietnam’s third-largest city, strategically
located in the country’s narrowest part,
near the coast. One of the few cities
where until 1968 there had been no U.S.
combat presence, it was virtually undefended and consequently a lucrative target for the North Vietnamese army and
the Viet Cong.
The battle of Hue was the largest single
engagement of the Vietnam War. It
lasted from 31 January to 25 February
1968 and (not counting civilian deaths)
claimed 5,713 casualties on both sides.
Smith describes the battle as a classic
joint and combined operation. The city
was divided into two areas of responsibility, with the South Vietnamese army assigned the mission of retaking the
northern portion and the U.S. Marines
that of regaining control south of the
Perfume River.
The urban conditions in Hue were comparable to those of Dodge City in the
American “Old West.” Some buildings
had wooden fronts, porches, and sidewalks; the streets were narrow, and buildings were densely concentrated. In the
middle of Hue, however, was a virtually
impregnable fortress known as the Citadel, with towers, ramparts, moats, concrete walls, and bunkers. The walls were
twenty-six feet high and in some sections
forty feet thick. The moat was ninety feet
wide at many points and up to twelve feet
deep. The Imperial Palace, another enclave within Hue, was surrounded by a
twenty-foot wall.
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Smith identifies three costly errors made
by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong
on the first day of their attack. First, they
failed to overrun the 1st ARVN Division
headquarters. Second, they failed to assault the U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) compound.
They had sufficient forces to accomplish
both missions. Third, they failed to destroy the An Cuu Bridge, south of the
city, leaving open a route by which the
Marines could reinforce and resupply the
MACV compound. The bridge was destroyed five days later by enemy sappers,
but too late. These errors most likely prevented the enemy from holding Hue for
longer than they did.
The value of this book lies in the lessons
learned by the forces fighting in Hue.
The first lesson was the value of accurate
intelligence. At the operational level, the
allies falsely believed that the massive
buildup of enemy troops around Khe
Sanh near the Demilitarized Zone meant
that the enemy did not have enough
manpower for a countrywide offensive.
At the tactical level, commanders routinely made decisions in the absence of
any specific intelligence about enemy
strength or dispositions in Hue. The importance of intelligence is best illustrated
by the events on the night of 16 February.
The enemy suffered a tremendous setback when, on the basis of an intercepted
radio message, allied artillery destroyed a
battalion-sized force trying to infiltrate
through a gate on the southwestern wall.
The second lesson involved the use of air
and artillery fire support. These supporting arms greatly facilitate fire and maneuver in any environment, especially in
cities; however, authorization for their
use in cities is normally restricted by
rules of engagement in order to limit collateral damage, and Hue was no
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exception. Unfortunately, the buildings
were fortresses, with interlocking lines of
fire from roofs, attics, and windows. The
South Vietnamese government eventually
lifted all restrictions on the use of heavy
weapons south of the Perfume River.
However, another limitation on heavy
firepower is weather. Naval gunfire,
eight-inch howitzer fire, and tactical aircraft support were frequently not readily
available because of poor conditions.
The third lesson is the complexity of
house-to-house fighting. Heavy weapons,
such as tanks, 106 mm recoilless rifles,
mortars, and 3.5-inch bazookas, were
used in Hue for street fighting. Objectives could be reached only by going
through buildings. The Marines dug
holes in walls through which they rushed,
clearing the rooms on the other side and
establishing sniper positions in preparation to take the next buildings. Streets
could be crossed only under a barrage of
covering fire. Mortars provided local indirect fire support that could be used in
lieu of larger weapons that were either
unauthorized or unavailable. Mortars
helped reduce the personnel-for-building
casualty ratio. The enemy forces in Hue
were well dug in, well supplied, and prepared in some cases to fight to the finish.
None of the Marines had had any training in street fighting prior to Hue.
Today’s efforts by the Joint Staff to develop urban-combat doctrine and by the
Marine Corps and Army to produce tactics, techniques, and procedures are
meant to ensure that the United States
does not face the same dilemma in the
future. Seventy-five percent of the
world’s population now resides in cities.
This will equate to eight to ten billion
people by the year 2025. The U.S. military used to fight for cities; now it is required to fight in them—cities similar to
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Hue. George W. Smith offers a very good
perspective on what such street fighting
is all about.

CNN claim that Operation TAILWIND involved killing U.S. deserters and the use
of the nerve agent Sarin.

Joseph Anderson
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army
Naval War College

Shultz begins his tale by explaining how
an aggressive Kennedy administration,
angered and humiliated by the Bay of
Pigs, formally placed CIA-controlled covert operations against North Vietnam
under military leadership. President Kennedy, his brother Robert, and other key
advisors wanted immediate results, and
they ignored the fact that a covert operation takes time to achieve its desired effect. Nor was the military high command
ecstatic about gaining this new responsibility. A generic aversion to special operations, fear of where Kennedy might be
taking the Army, and distrust of many
involved in Special Operations, resulted
in a bureaucratic struggle of rare intensity and duration. One of the tragic ironies emerging from Shultz’s research is
that from the beginning, senior U.S. military and political leaders effectively prevented SOG, which was charged with the
new covert mission, from achieving its
full potential.

Shultz, Richard H., Jr. The Secret War against Hanoi: Kennedy’s and Johnson’s Use of Spies, Saboteurs,
and Covert Warriors in North Vietnam. New York:
HarperCollins, 1999. 408pp. $27.50

At its core, this is a remarkably well told
story of failure—heartbreaking failure to
be sure, and failure despite the heroic
efforts of some remarkable men to
achieve success, but still failure. The U.S.
covert war against Hanoi was, as this
book makes clear, patently unsuccessful.
That it could have been otherwise makes
the story all the more compelling.
A leading expert on low-intensity conflict
and covert warfare, Shultz has filled a gap
that has troubled those who for decades
have been trying to understand the Vietnam War. Using meticulously documented
research, and writing in a reader-friendly
style, Shultz lays out the history of the
U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam Studies and Observations Group
(usually referred to simply as “SOG”)
from 1964 to 1972. Such a book is arguably long overdue, but classification of
material and the lack of documented interviews with former SOG members crippled previous attempts. At worst, the
operations of SOG have suffered gross
distortions, turning one of the war’s most
interesting features into farce and pulp
fiction. Happily, this is no longer the
case. Now, using newly declassified documents, Shultz lays to rest many of the
myths—including the now-infamous
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Thus, the cards were stacked against SOG
from the start. One obstacle was an administration that, following President
Kennedy’s assassination, seemed hesitant
to take advantage of apparent opportunities. Nor did SOG ever receive proper
support from the military or CIA leadership. Opposition from senior members of
the State Department was at times ferocious. In addition, SOG’s South Vietnamese counterpart was never fully
trusted, possibly with good reason. As a
result SOG rarely had the right mandate
or qualified people, operated under
byzantine restrictions, and never
achieved a rapport with the one organization that could have dramatically increased its effectiveness. Shultz also
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